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Prosecutorial
Immunity:
Through The
Looking Glass
by Max Stul Oppenheimer,
Venable, Baetjer and Howard
and Paul Mark Sandler,
Cohan, Altman and Sandler
"[M]ore mischief has come to good
men by these kind of approvements by
false accusations of desperate villians
than of benefit to the public of the discovery and convicting of real offenders."
Sir Mathew Hale (1609-1676)
History of the Pleas of the
Crown, P. 226 (1778 Ed.)
~ While the grant of immunity in the
course of criminal trials has concerned
the judiciary since the time of Mathew
Hale, it has now captured public attention with the granting of immunity by
prosecutors in connection with the recent trials of once highly respected political figures. Typically a prosecutor offers
immunity to one or more potential defendants, (hereinafter referred to as the
"Witness Defendants"), in order to obtain their testimony against another defendant, (hereinafter referred to as the
"Target Defendant"). While there has
been much commentary on the implications of immunity for the Witness Defendant, this article focuses on the implications of such grants of immunity for the
Target Defendant. *
These implications manifest themselves in two significant instances. First,
assume A and B are indicted for a crime
which A and C committed and A has
agreed to testify against B in return for
immunity. Although C can establish B's
innocence by testifying that C and A
committed the crime, he refuses to do so
unless he can obtain immunity. It has
generally been held, as discussed below,
that B may not grant C immunity*, and
therefore, B may not obtain C's testimony. This situation raises the question
whether B's right to due process is vio-

[IJ

THE FORUM

lated because of the possibility of his
conviction resulting from the inability of
bringing forth exculpatory testimony
from C. Second, as discussed below,
prosecutorial immunity is a creature of
statute. Where no statute exists, a prosecutor has no authority to grant immunity. Often, where no immunity statute
exists, a prosecutor enters an agreement
not to prosecute a Witness Defendant in
exchange for inculpatory testimony
against a Target Defendant. This accomplishes the same result as a formal
grant of immunity and imposes upon the
target defendant such burdens as does
the formal grant of immunity.
The exchange of immunity raises the
threshold question of whether selectivity
in prosecution is consistent with equal
protection. While this argument has
been advanced, it has uniformly been
held that a difference in treatment by the
government in the prosecution of a case
is not necessarily a violation of equal protection. *
It is the thesis of this article that where
the prosecutor has a statutory right to
grant immunity the defense should have
a comparable right and that prosecution
should not be permitted to be based on
testimony obtained by non-statutory
grants of immunity. First, however, we
turn to the origin of immunity and briefly
trace it from its common law beginnings
to its modern usage to set the perspective of this article.
~ Approvement was one of the earliest incentives devised by English
Common Law to elicit the testimony of
an offender against his accomplices.
Under early common law an individual
indicted and in custody of the sheriff
could confess and accuse his accomplices. The court, in its discretion,
could accept the confession and permit
the individual confessing guilt to be
an "approver"; in such a case the accomplice, not the approver, was tried.
Variations in the institutions of approvement permitted the approver to
challenge the accomplice to trial by battle. If the accomplice were found guilty,
the approver was pardoned; if the accomplice were found not guilty, the approver was hanged. * The practice of approvement "with its conditions that the

appellee could claim a trial by battle and
that grace to the approver should be dependent on his conviction of his associate in crime, was plainly at variance
with modern sentiments and habits, and
the consequence was that it passed out
of use." * However, other incentives
were devised to obtain the testimony of
an offender against his accomplices.
Lord Mansfield noted the existence of
rewards, statutory pardons, and the
concept of an equitable claim for mercy
by one who gave evidence against an
accomplice. *
If Prosecutorial Immunity is to be justified as an outgrowth of these institutions, it must be recognized that the organizational structure of criminal prosecution in England is notably different
from that in the United States. A distingUishing feature of prosecution in England is private prosecution: if the English
attorney general declines to initiate a
prosecution, the victim of the alleged
crime has the right to do so. * Thus, although the English attorney general
could order a Nolle Prosequi of a
prosecution, his decision not to prosecute does not confer immunity as it
would in the United States. In fact, the
great majority of prosecutions are presented by police offers rather than the attorney general, whose main function is
to prosecute certain serious crimes and
certain cases referred to him by government departments and local authorities.
Glanville Williams suggests that one reason for the wide discretion within the office of the Common Law Prosecutors is
this feature of private prosecution. *
~ The concept of a public official as
the prime prosecutor of criminal cases
was a creation of the American judicial
system. Connecticut is recorded to have
created the first public prosecutor as
early as 1704. * The Judiciary Act of
1789, Section 30 provided that the
United States would be represented
by a U.S. Attorney, later the Attorney
General. (See State v. Hunter, 10 Md.
App. 300 (1970), for a history of prosecutorial developments in the State of
Maryland. The Court pointed out that
the office of the State's Attorney was
carved from the Common Law Office of
Attorney General, but numerous legisla-

tive enactments defined the position.)
The United States Attorney first began
to control local district attorneys at the
time of the American Civil War. Several
factors might have contributed to the
failure of the American Legal System to
adopt a Common Law System of private
prosecution. First, the American prosecutor is depicted as a combination of the
powers and duties of the English Attorney General and the French Procureur
Du Roi. Second, it was felt that the office
of the prosecutor must be fair and independent, which a private person could
not be. (E.g. Bienel v. State, 71 Wis.
444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888), wherein the
Court commented that the public prosecutor could never be promoted by the
conviction of the innocent, and that the
duty of the prosecutor could never be
fulfilled by the conduct of prosecution by
paid attorneys of parties who, for passion, prejudice or even honest belief in
the guilt of the accused would be desirous of procuring his prosecution. ) A third
factor might be the exasperation of the
American Common Law with the result
of irresponsible practice of law by Court
officials and "pettifoggers." (This very
interesting epoch in the development of
American law is described by Roscoe
Pound in, The Lawyer From Antiquity to
Modern Times, West Publishing Co.
(1953), p. 135. Dean Pound pOinted out
that the pettifogger stage followed "an
attempt to get on without lawyers" by
the colonists.)
The need for Prosecutorial Immunity
in the United States emerged not as a
matter of royal grace, but rather as an
outgrowth of the Fifth Amendment provision of the United States Constitution
that "no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." An accomplice could not be
compelled to testify against his cohorts if
in so doing he might incriminate himself.
Prosecutors seeking testimony against
a Target Defendant attempted to satisfy
the Fifth Amendment right of the testifying witness by agreeing not to prosecute
him. It was argued that this removed the
risk of self-incrimation and, therefore,
permitted compulsion of testimony.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held
that the prosecutor had no inherent au-

thority to bestow immunity and, therefore, a witness could refuse to testify regardless of such an agreement. * With the
emergence of immunity statutes, the Fifth
Amendment right of the testifying witness could be overcome. These statutes
supplied the prosecutor with authority to
grant immunity. A testifying witness
could be compelled to give inculpatory
evidence against a Target Defendant if
he were first guaranteed that no selfincriminating use would be made of his
testimony.
The scope of immunity constitutionally required to satisfy the Fifth Amendment has had an interesting development. (For a detailed discussion, see
Shapiro, Adequacy Under Federal Constitution of Immunity Granted in Lieu of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 32
L.Ed. 2d 869. Annotation). In Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 U.S. 547, 1892)
the United States Supreme Court invalidated an early immunity statute which
only gave an accused "use immunity."
Thi; type of immunity prohibits the use
of the testimony itself (although it does
not prohibit the use of testimony derived
from the compelled testimony) in a subsequent prosecution. In Ullman v. United States* the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitUtionality of a
statute which provided for "transactional immunity." This type of immunity
prohibits the prosecution of the witness
for any transaction as to which he is testifying under compulsion. Finally, inKastigar v. United States (406 U.S. 441,
1972) the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a much
narrower form of immunity than transactional immunity: "use and derivative use
immunity." This type of immunity prohibits not only the direct use of the testimony, as prohibited in the statute invalidated by Counselman v. Hitchcock,
but also prohibits the use of any testimony derived from the compelled testimony.
Following the decision in Kastigar,
Congress enacted 18 U.S.c.A. Section
6001-6005, which repealed prior immunity statutes and substituted in their
place a general "use and derivative use"
immunity statute. This statute covers all
proceedings before courts, federal agen-

cies, and congressional committees, and
prohibits a witness' refusal to testify on
the basis of his privilege and includes a
prohibition of the use of testimony which
he has furnished under compulsion
against the witness in any criminal case.
The general procedure for compelling
testimony under this action is that aU. S.
Attorney, with the approval of the Attorney General, makes application to a federal judge for the grant of immunity to a
witness who' 'has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination." Once the order is issued by the judge the witness may not
refuse to testify, under penalty of being
in contempt of court.
~ Unlike the federal statutes, the
Maryland immunity statutes are not
found in one central location; rather,
they are scattered throughout the Maryland Code and arranged according to
the substantive aspect of law to which
the statute applies. A proposed general
immunity statute (House Bill 541) was
rejected by the General Assembly in
1972. The Maryland immunity statutes
include granting immunity to witnesses
for testimony in prosecutions for the following:
a)
bribery of public officials
(Article 27, Section 23)
b)
bribery in athletic contests
(Article 27, Section 24)
c)
conspiracy to bribe
(Article 27, Section 39)
d)
gambling
(Article 27, Section 262)
e)
obtaining liquor by a
minor
(Article 27, Section 400)
f)
sabotage
(Article 27, Section 540)
g)
violation of fair election
practices
(Article 33, Section 26)
h)
control of dangerous substances
(Article 27, Section 298)
i)
violations of insurance
law
(Article 48A, Section 28)
j)
violation of unemployment insurance law
(Article 95A, Section 12J)
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k)

violation of workmen's
compensation law
(Article 101, Section 8)
l)
violation of Retail Sales
Tax Act
(Article 81, Section 359)
and for testimony in certain supplementary or discovery proceedings (Courts
and Judicial Proceedings, § 9-119).
A review of the Maryland immunity
statues reveals that there is no uniformity
as to the type of immunity to be granted
under these statutes. For example, Article
27, Section 540; Article 40A, Section
359; Article 95A, Section 12J; and Article 101, Section 8, appear to grant
"transactional immunity" while Article
81, Section 359 and Article 75, Section
74 appear to grant simply "use immunity". Although there appear to have
been no challenges to these statutes'
constitutionality, the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock seems to suggest
that the latter statutes are constitutionally
insufficient. (Immunity does not violate
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
However State immunity statutes must
comply with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission 378
U.S. 52). The decision in Kastigar v. United States seems to indicate that the
former statutes grant broader immunity
than constitutionally necessary.
Like the federal immunity statutes,
most of the Maryland statutes require an
application by the prosecutor to the
court for the granting of immunity.
However, immunity granted pursuant to
Article 27, Section 298, sub-section C,
the Controlled Dangerous Substance
Act, does not require the prosecutor to
obtain an order of court. This section has
been interpreted as being self-executing.
(Roll v. State, 15 Md. App. 31, As to the
special problems of such "automatic
immunity" statute, See McCormick,
Evicence § 143 footnote 14.)
~ While statutory immunity may be
considered the only legitimate form of
immunity, the same result is often accomplished through a prosecutor's
agreement not to institute criminal proceedings. Such non-statutory immunity,
may take the form of the prosecutor entering a Nolle Prosequi, accomplished
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with the consent of the court or an acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense. *
From the viewpoint of a Target Defendant, it is irrelevant whether the Testifying Witness has been granted immunity
or given an agreement not to prosecute;
the effect is the same. Even absent
statutory authority, the witness has an
equitable claim to immunity from prosecution, similar to the eighteenth century equity claim commented upon by
Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Rudd. * While
this non-statutory* claim does not bar
prosecution as an automatic right, as a
practical matter an accomplice who has
testified pursuant to an agreement with
the prosecutor will generally go unprosecuted. *
Non-statutory immunity is sometimes
justifed as being an outgrowth of presecutorial discretion, derived from the
discretionary powers inherited from the
english Attorney General. In the United
States, unlike in Great Britain, if a prosecutor decides not to prosecute, the private citizen generally has no further recourse. * Discretion is so established in
the U.S. that if two individuals are
equally deserving of prosecution, the
prosecutor can determine to prosecute
one and not the other even if the motivation for the distinction stems from considerations extreneous to justice, such as
personal dislike of an individual or political advantage. * If the prosecutor declines to prosecute the courts have no
power to compel initiation of criminal
proceedings. * This lack of power to
compel initiation of proceedings results
in the de facto power of the prosecutor to
grant immunity even absent statutory
authorization.
~ It has been held that Statutory Immunity per se does not violate the Due
Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. *
However, testimony obtained in exchange for immunity should be viewed
with distrust. * In the ordinary case of a
witness testifying, the testimony serves
an informative purpose only and the
witness' interest is in whether the trier of
fact believes his testimony. However, in
the case of a Witness Defendant, the testimony serves a dual purpose. Not only
does it inform the trier of fact as to the issues in the instant case, but it also sets

the limits of the witness' benefit: the
more he tells, the broader is his immunity. Thus, the witness' interest is not
only in the truth of his testimony, but also
in the breadth of his immunity. As long
as the witness remains silent, discovery
of independent evidence may result in
his prosecution. But to the extent he testifies under a grant of "transactional immunity," he insulates himself, and even
where he only obtains' 'use and derivative use immunity," he places a burden
upon the prosecutor to establish the independent sourse of inculpatory testimony in a subsequent prosecution.
Under these circumstances, it is arguable
that the temptation to commit perjury
may be so strong as to require special
treatment, much as exclusion of the suspect testimony; or, if the inherent suspicion of the testimony of self-interested
witnesses is viewed as going only to the
weight of evidence, an instruction to the
jury as to the circumstances surrounding
such testimony should suffice. *
Apart from the untrustworthiness of
immunized testimony, there is a more
serious due process issue. Consider
again the hypothetical situation set forth
in the introduction: A and B are indicted
for a crime which A and C committed
and A has agreed, pursuant to statute, to
testify against B in return for immunity.
Although C can establish B's innocence
by testifying that C and A committed the
crime, he refuses to do so unless he can
obtain immunity. If B cannot grant C
immunity and therefore cannot obtain
C's exculpatory testimony, B's right to
due process is denied because he is denied effective confrontation, effective
compulsory process, the right to obtain
exculpatory evidence, and the right to a
presumption of innocence.
In Chambers v. Mississippi, * the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a defendant
was denied a fair trial when he was denied the opportunity under the hearsay
rule to introduce evidence that another
had admitted committing the crime as
well as the opportunity to cross-examine
the alleged perpetrator of the crime. Effective confrontation of witnesses involves more than the right to ask questions on cross-examination. It is
suggested that it must include the right to

produce independent testimony bearing
on the credibility of direct testimony. *
In our assumed factual situation, A has
committed a crime. It cannot be assumed that he would shrink from perjury
in order to save himself from prosecution. The temptation to commit perjury is
all the greater if A knows that the only
person who can contradict him, C, will
be unable to testify for fear of his own
prosecution. Thus, B should be permitted to call C and introduce testimony in
contradiction to A's testimony, because
there is no other meaningful way to confront A.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that the accused
shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. That clause
provides for more than the right of a defendant to have a witness brought into
the courtroom. In Washington v.
Texas, * a state statute permitted coparticipants in a crime to testify for the
prosecution but not for one another. The
U.S. Supreme Court held this statute
unconstitutional despite the state's argument that it had not refused the right
to confrontation. The Court forcused on
the question of admissibility and held
that the Sixth Amendment right is at least
broad enough to put a witness on the
stand. In Bray v. Peyton, * the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
relying on Washington v. Texas, reversed a defendant's conviction when
the government incarcerated an indictted defense witness, thereby depriving
the accused of the benefit of what he
claimed was exculpatory testimony. In
Bray, the defendant was on trial for
statutory rape, and intended to call a
witness who would testify to the witness'
prior illicit relations with the victim to establish that the victim was a consenting
lewd female. The witness attended the
trial and was arrested and charged with
assault upon the victim and thus was
prevented from giving exculpatory testimony.
The question then is whether the constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation is cognizable only when denied explicity, as in Washington v.
Texas; or whether an equally effective
indirect means of denying the defense

the right to put a witness on the stand is
also unconstitutional. Under the latter interpretation, refusal to grant immunity to
witnesses favorable to the defense
would be unconstitutional. It is unreasonable to expect that a defense witness
would willingly testify if such testimony
would cost his freedom. The threat of
criminal prosecution is an equally effective method of blocking the admission of
favorable testimony as the statute held
unconstitutional in Washington v. Texas.
Refusal to permit the defendant to obtain testimony by granting immunity
further collides with the constitutional
rights of the Target Defendant by creating a situation which tolerates the suppression of exculpatory evidence. It is
settled that a prosecutor may not knowingly permit a witness to testify falsely,
Alcorta v. Texas, * even when the falsity
of the testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. * Moreover, the prosecutor may not suppress facts favoring the
accused, Brady v. Maryland* and Giles
v. Maryland. *
In Brady, the Court stated' '... we now
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated due process
where the evidence is material either to
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." * Denying the Target Defendant
the right to grant immunity allows the

prosecutor to suppress potentially exculpatory evidence, the result condemned in Brady.
The underlying assumption in an adversary system is that when both sides of
a controversy are fully presented to an
impartial trier of fact, a just result will be
reached. InDennis v. United States * the
U.S. Supreme Court stated:
" ... it is especially important that the defense, the judge and the jury should
have the assurance that the doors that
may lead to truth have been unlocked.
In our adversary system for determining
guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable
for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a store house of relevant fact. Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the
clearest and most compelling considerations."
No court has yet faced the issue of
whether due process requires the state to
permit a Target Defendant the right to
grant immunity to a witness in the situation where the government grants its
witnesses immunity. That problem did
arise in Gregorio v. United States. * During the course of the trial the government
granted immunity to one of its witnesses
and defense counsel had called to the
stand a witness who invoked the fifth
amendment. Subsequently, the defense
counsel inquired of the witness whether
he would testify if granted immunity,
even though the government had made
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known its refusal to grant immunity. Defense counsel did not pursue the request
for immunity and withdrew his witness.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, refused to consider the question, resting instead on the technical
ground that the defendant failed properly to raise the argument at trial and did
not preserve the record for appeal.
It is suggested that defense counsel
did establish a sufficient record in Gregorio for appellate review. * However,
to avoid the problem, counsel should file
a pre-trial motion to compel the state to
grant immunity to the defendant's witness. This motion should include a request to suppress the testimony of the
government's witness if the government
does not grant the immunity requested
for the defense witness. *
A problem could arise if a defense witness, who cooperated prior to trial, suddenly balks when called to the stand and
claims the fifth amendment privilege.
The question arises whether defense
counsel could confer immunity on the
recalcitrant witness at that point. Certainly the defense is in a much weaker
posture, because the remedy of suppression is unavailable; although, the
power of the court to declare a mistrial or
the court's contempt power might be
utilized. Whenever defense counsel intends to examine a witness who might
claim the fifth amendment, the appropriate motion to compel immunity
should be filed prior to trial; this would
protect counsel from the last minute
change of heart.
Likewise, the defense has a more difficult burden in insisting on a grant of
immunity where the prosecution has not
done so. There is an appealing symmetry to the proposition that whatever
tool the prosecution may use should also
be available to the defense; where the
prosecution has not used that tool, the
symmetry argument works against the
defense. For example, in Earl v. United
States * the defendant asked that immunity be granted to his witness, although
the government had not offered immunity to any witness. The court held that it
lacked the power to compel the prosecutor, who was an agent of the Executive
Branch of the government, to exercise
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his power to grant immunity.
Judge Leventhal, writing a dissenting
opinion to the court's decision denying a
rehearing en bane, stated that perhaps
the problem posed by the inability of the
defendant to compel testimony could be
solved by a charge bringing to the attention of the jury the fact that the government had refused to grant immunity to a
witness who the defendant claimed
could exonerate him. This solution falls
short of solving the problem, because it
still deprives the Target Defendant of the
right to put forth all the relevant evidence
in his defense. The jury should not be allowed to speculate as to what evidence
the miSSing witness would proffer; in
fact, it would be improper for the jury to
do so. See Bruton v. United States, *
wherein the United States Supreme
Court indicated that jury instructions
cannot always be employed to correct a
flaw in procedure that affects constitutional rights. Furthermore, the jury instruction suggestion improperly shifts
the resolution of the dilemma to the
shoulders of the defendant. The initial
burden is on the government to demonstrate clear and compelling considerations for depriving the Target Defendant
of his right to unlock the doors of truth,
Dennis v. United States. *
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction ... " If the
defense cannot compel exculpatory testimony because it cannot confer immunity, a jury instruction would require
consideration of testimony that was not
produced and would force the jury into
unpermitted speculation on matters that
have not been introduced into evidence.
At least in cases where there is statutory
authorization for prosecutorial immunity, it is arguable that the defense
should be afforded a comparable right
to immunize witnesses even if the prosecution has not exercised its right to do
so. Rights rather than the exercise of
those rights should be equivalent. The
mere fact that the prosecutor chooses
not to exercise his right should not force
the defense to forego its right any more
than the defense could preclude the
prosecutor from cross-examining the de-

fendant on the grounds that the defense
had not cross-examined any prosecution witnesses.
Two arguments might be advanced as
"compelling considerations" to justify
denying the Target Defendant the right
to compel testimony on his behalf: the
spectre of the immunity bath and the
threat of perjury. The immunity bath
problem would have been more troubling prior to Kastigar v. United States. *
Prior cases had indicated that in order to
overcome the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, it was constitutionally necessary to grant' 'transactional immunity," that is, to insulate the
witness against prosecution for any
transaction as to which he testified. Thus
there was a real danger that a defendant
could grant blanket immunity to anyone
he chose and that the Target Defendant
could permit a co-defendant to testify
and thus preclude a prosecution of the
co-defendant. Under Kastigar, the standard for overcoming the fifth amendment privilege is "use and derivative use
immunity," thus limiting the witness'
immunity to the prevention of the use of
any of his testimony or its fruits in a subsequent prosecution. The post-Kastigar
federal statute provides for' 'use and derivative use immunity."
Thus the government is still free to
prosecute a witness if it can affirmatively
establish an independent basis for its information. It should be apparent that the
prosecution is not prejudiced by the defense's grant of "use and derivative use
immunity" since the only restriction on
future prosecution is that the government may not use, directly or indirectly,
the testimony of the witness against himself. This is precisely the same restriction
that would apply in prosecution of the
witness in any event; the fifth amendment would, even absent the grant of
immunity, deprive the government of
precisely the evidence which the defense
grant of immunity does.
The perjury problem involves the fear
that a Target Defendant will enlist the
support of a co-consipirator to testify
falsely on his behalf. The risk of false testimony from a prosecution witness is at
least as great since he is, by definition,
vulnerable to indictment. Judge Leven-

thai in Earl v. United States* suggested
that the solution to that problem is an
appropriate instruction advising the jury
that in considering the credibility of the
prosecution witness' testimony, it may
consider the fact that the witness has
been granted immunity for his testimony. Presumably this solution could
also be applied to an immunized defense
witness. The underlying reasoning
which leads to the suspicion that the defendant will solicit perjured testimony
appears to be based on the notion that
the accused is suspect and therefore testimony in his behalf is suspect. The defendant is presumed innocent and therefore testimony on his behalf should not
be presumed entitled to less respect than
testimony offered by the prosecution.
~ A prosecutor's offer of immunity
without statutory authority violates due
process when the fruits of that offer are
used to convict a Target Defendant. Due
process is violated not because the prosecutor's offer of immunity to the Witness
Defendant is itself unlawful, * but because the prosecutor thus unlawfully obtains evidence against the Target Defendant. As set forth above, a prosecutor
has no inherent authority to grant immunity. The legislature has defined
those certain areas in which the prosecutor may not only voluntarily limit his own
actions, but also may absolutely foreclose future prosecution by coordinate
and successor prosecutors. * When a
prosecutor goes beyond those bounds,
he is intruding upon a field pre-empted
by the legislature.
Justice Field in a concurring opinion in
US. V. San Jacinto Tin Co. * remarked:
"I do not recognize the doctrine that
the Attorney General takes any power
by virtue of his office except what the
Constitution and the laws confer. The
powers of the executives of England
are not invested in the executive officers of the llnited States."*
When the prosecutor goes beyond
legislatively-approved areas and the
Target Defendant is convicted as a result
of the unauthorized agreement not to
prosecute, evidence is unlawfully obtained and there is a violation of the
Target Defendant's right to due process
of law. In several analogous cases, to

prevent incriminating evidence from
being obtained by unlawful means, the
courts have adopted a policy of excluding such evidence and the fruits
thereof. * To prevent a prosecutor from
offering immunity without statutory authority and proceeding against the
Target Defendant, a similar exclusionary
rule should be applied. The defense attorney should raise this procedual point
by an appropriate motion to suppress or
a motion in limine. If the trial court rules
adversely on the motion, the argument
will be preserved for appeal. *
~ A program for Maryland: Prosecutorial Immunity, as presently employed,
raises serious questions and poses significant challenges not only to the constitutional framework of our legal system, but
also to the basic philosophy of its application. Ours is an accusatorial system. A
presumably innocent person is charged
with a crime and, upon being charged, is
cloaked with a variety of protective
rights. It is inconsistent with this protection that he does not have the right to
compel exculpatory testimony by granting immunity, when the prosecutor has
the right to compel inculpatory testimony by granting immunity. The denial of this right violates his right to due
process.
Although the spectre of the immunity
bath and the threat of perjury are advanced as reasons for denying the accused the right to grant immunity, these
reasons do not withstand scrutiny. Kastigar and its progeny of "use and derivative use" immunity statutes undermine
the immunity bath argument, and the
threat of perjury by defense-immunized
witnesses cannot be demonstrated to be
greater than that of prosecutionimmunized witnesses.
In light of the weaknesses of the present system of immunity, changes are in
order. Grants of immunity absent statutory authorization are, under present
Maryland law, unlawful. They must be
di$ontinued. The Maryland immunity
statutes are neither uniform nor in conformity with present constitutional standards. They should be revised to recognize Kastigar and Counselman. In the
process, the advisability of a general
immunity statute should be considered.

Although there do not appear to have
been any attempts to so utilize them,
several of the Maryland immunity statutes may be broad enough to confer
immunity-granting power on defendants. However, the majority of the statutes clearly grant such power to prosecutors only. There does not appear to be
any justification for the differences in
statutory language on this point. The statutes should be uniform and should
either grant the defendant the right to
grant immunity or should deny the right
to both defendant and prosecution.
1. Immunity Granted without Statutory Authorization
Maryland law is clear that the prosecutor has no inherent authority to grant
immunity. However, as noted above, it
is impossible to prevent a prosecutor
from refUSing to initiate a criminal proceeding for whatever reason. Part of the
solution must be a change in the
philosophy of individual prosecutors.
However, it is suggested that more aggressive investigation of the circumstances surrounding prosecution
testimony may provide defense attorneys with an avenue for suppressing
such unauthorized immunized testimony.
2. Breadth of Immunity
As set forth above, the Maryland immunity statutes provide for varying types.
of immunity: "use," "use and derivative
use," and "transactional." "Use" im~
munity is, under Counselman, constitutionally insufficient; "use" immunity statutes should therefore be revised rathe,r
than waiting for a court challenge to their
validity. "Transactional" immUl:ity is,
under Ullman, constitutional, but Kastigar indicates that a lesser grant will suffice. The immunity bath has been raised
as an argument against the defendant's
granting immunity, but it has never been
carried to its logical conclusion: the risk is
present in prosecutorial grants of immunity as well. There is a risk of immunity
baths whenever "transactional" immunity is granted. Therefore, unless there is
a compelling reason to retain "transactional" immunity, these statutes should
be revised to provide only "use and derivative use" immunity.
3. The Defendant's Right to Grant
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Immunity
There are two solutions to the due
process problems raised above: deny
the right to grant immunity to both sides
or grant it to both sides. Simply abolishing immunity is an unsatisfactory solution for other reasons,. though. As
pointed out above, it is impossible to entirely prevent the prosecutor from granting the functional eqUivalent of immunity because of his unreviewable discretion in initiating prosecutions. The best
that can be done is to prevent him from
absolutely barring other prosecutors
from doing so. Furthermore, it is arguable that even where the prosecutor has
no right to grant immunity, the defendant's rights of confrontation and compulsory process require that he have the
right to do so.
The language of some Maryland immunity statutes may, in fact, be broad
enough to afford the defendant the
power to confer immunity. For example,
in the Prohibited Election Practices immunity section (Art. 33 § 26-16(a) a witness "in any criminal prosecution" may
obtain "transactional" immunity. In the
sale of liquor to minors section (Art 27 §
400) "use" immunity may be conferred
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on any minor furnishing testimony "".in
the prosecution of any person for selling
liquor to minors." While it may seem
apparent that the intent was to use the
word "prosecution" to mean the prosecutor's side of the case, it is arguable that
"prosecution" means the entire case.
This argument is reinforced by the fact
that the legislature, in other sections of
the Code, is explicit in limiting the right to
grant immunity to the prosecutor. For
Example, the Controlled Dangerous
Substance Immunity section (Art 27 §
298 and the Conspiracy to Bribe section
(Art 27 § 39) provide immunity only for
those who testify on behalf of the state.
The Bribery in Athletic Contests section
(Art 27 § 25) provides immunity only for
those compelled to "testify against" the
defendant. The Sabotage immunity section (Art 27 § 540) provides immunity
for those testimony is "required of him
by the State."
The fact that it is arguable that the right
to compel testimony by granting immunity may exist for defendants in certain
prosecutions is hardly the solution to the
due process problem, though. It merely
emphasizes (if it does exist) the irrationality of the present immunity system in
Maryland. Why should prohibited election practices and furnishing liquor to
minors merit special treatment?

The right of a criminal defendant to
confer immunity when necessary to
compel exculpatory testimony should be
recognized as a general principal of law.
Safeguards (such as limiting the scope of
immunity to "relevant" or "necessary"
testimony) may be appropriate, but the
need for safeguards should not preclude
the recognition of the right.
(Footnotes available from authors upon request.)
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Law Placement
Do you need a part-time law clerk, a summer law
clerk or a full-time law graduate? Or, do you have
a law related position that you would like to have
competently filled?
Contact Assistant Dean William I. Weston
at the Law Placement Service at the University of Baltimore
r.:tCIlU'lJl

of Law, 1420 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Md. 21202.
Telephone (301) 727-6350, ext. 251

METHOD MATTERS

The key to Maryland Bar Review Course, Inc. students' success rate
is the way the materials to be reviewed are presented in our classes.
Our method is based on a very basic principle, that the direct approach is the best approach. Since our aim is students passing the
bar exam, the direct approach means studying for it by using actual
and hypothetical bar exam questions.
That means that in the course of discussing the questions all the
necessary black letter law is reviewed. The student learns how the
theory fits the facts, why one concept is correct, another incorrect.
He learns how to read bar exam questions, how to analyse them,
how to formulate a correct answer. And he learns what issues are
important and recurrent on the bar exam. All in the course of discussing and analysing bar exam type questions.
We use a similar approach for the Multistate Exam preparation.
Maryland Bar Review Course, Inc. presents the most coherent and
direct preparation for the Maryland State Bar Exam available. That's
why we can say we offer the best review program in Maryland. It
works. Our students have proved it.
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Representatives:
Robert Blackford 247-4000
Richard Burch 366-6973

Jana Guy 523-6349
Susan Watson 730-3249

MARYLAND BAR REVIEW COURSE, INC.
Box 70 • New Windsor, Md. ·21776 • (301) 875-2472
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